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THg PROBLEM 
The most recant International Wheat Agreement bemire) effective August 1, 
1956. Is it, in its present form, the new beginning or the "beginning of the 
end" of intergovernmental cooperation in wheat trade? Opinions among experts 
are varied. 
One could put the same euestion in another way; did the world use the 
opportunity given by the earlier IWA's to develop stable conditions in the 
world wheat market? If not, why not? M111 the world reject agreem;nts like 
the in in the future? Will it go back to "laissez-faire" in wheat trade? 
Or will some other policy emerge? What future policy would he posuible and 
realistic? 
For the first time in history, a vorld-wide agreement was reached in 
1933 guarantying the exchange of certain quantities of wheat at a fixed maxi- 
mum and minimum price to all interested countries who signed the agreement. 
But this first attempt did not get much attention because soon after ratifica- 
tion years of low crop production and preparations for war diverted attention 
toward other, more immediate problems. 
Such an agreement is possible only between governments which control the 
wheat planning in their countries because the guaranteed quantities must be 
available in time and subsidies must be paid if needed in order to meat export 
com,litments. In order to fulfill import agreements the countries must take 
the guaranteed quotas and are obligated to oversee the financing of these 
imports in the appropriated currency. These problems apparently cannot be 
handled through normal private channels or by free enterprise without govern- 
ment intervention in some manner. 
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In the be ,inning of world -wide wheat trade there was an uncounted number 
of producers and suppliers who were available to an innumerable multitude of 
buyers and consumers all over the world in mo-e-or-less free competition. In 
most cases the supply and demand mat at an equilibrium price. This situation 
changed following World Mar I as more governments undertook to regulate wheat. 
Today world trade is limited to relatively few groups either governments 
or government created monopolies. The main supply is represented by only 
four to six countries. Monopolistic conditions are present in the world wheat 
market. The demand side shows a similar pict re. Instead of thousands of 
individual buyers, acting through importers, there are only forty to sixty 
nations importing wheat. Selling and buying is now the task of governments! 
Does this world -wide development guarantee a free maret mechanism and 
a price reflecting the supply and demand situation? Obviously not. In order 
to show how these changes have tacen place there is here presented a theo- 
retical framework explaining the development in world wheat trade from pure 
competition to governmental trade, dictated largely by political reasons. 
Intermediate steps were monopolistic competition and monopoly or oligopoly. 
Chamberlin defined pure competition as "involving a relatively large 
number of buyers and sellers of a perfectly standardized product. la 
The time before World War I is usually considered to fulfill these con- 
ditions best. The price of wheat was determined by the supply of a large 
number of sellers and the demand by a large number of buyers. The product 
was nearly standardized. 
1E. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 16. 
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This situation had the following advantages: (1) the mart nns cleared 
at an equilibrium point and (2) the single buyer or seller had no price in- 
fluence on the market through alteration of the quantitz, he offered to buy or 
to sell. 
In Plate I, Fig. 1 pure conaetition is demonstrated. The demand and 
supply curves "dd" and "as" equate at the equilibrium price "H". The quantity 
"GE" will be sold. Applied to the wheat market, it shows the quantity of 
wheat which will be purchased under pure competition at an equilibrium price 
corresponding to a given demand and supply condition. This was approximately 
a true picture for agriculture before World far I. Fig. 2 indicates the 
situation of one individual wheat producer under pure competition whose demand 
curve "dd" infinitely is elastic. 
The main disadvantage of this purely competitive market was the large 
fluctuation of farm incomes, due to unforeseeable growing conditions and 
economic considerations. Large crops with usually lower prices and small crops 
with consequently higher nrices to the producer under asswled similar demand 
indicated the dilemma at those times of a free comnotiUive market. 
After World liar I, social and political reasons combined with the tendency 
of agricultural production to meet falling, prices with increasing output due 
to high fixed cost per acre or unit led to changes in the competitive market 
structure. Some governments began to assure farmers higher prices than could 
be realized at the world market. From this, monopolistic governmental inter- 
vention developed in wheat trade. Triffin defined monopolistic conditions 
"The competing monopolists hove the choice between either determining the price 
and letting the buyer decide on the quantity demanded, or leaving the price to 
be worked out on the market by the competitive bidding of buyers."1 
Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p. 52. 
EMANATION OF PLATE I 
Fig. 1. Pure Competition. Supply and demand determine price and quantity at 
an equilibrium point. 
Fig. 2. Pure Competition. Infinitely elastic demand curve for output of a 
single" competitor (no price influence). 
Fig. 3. Monopoly. Price is determined by the shifted supply curve as to 
s'st by one monopolist. 
Fig. 4. Price agreement. Price is determined by agreement in market shares 
between two monopolistic suppliers. 
Fig. 3. 
PLATE I 
P 
d 
5 
Fig. 2. 
d 
WI\ 
111111111111111111111111111M1111111116. 
E 
10001111110001110111 
H, H 
Fig. 4. 
6 
Plate Ij Fig. 3 shows the shift of supply by one monopolist from "ss" 
to "Os" resulting in the smaller quantity "G -jE1" and the higher price 
"H E1". Under wheat trade conditions a governmental monopoly affected the 
available quantity through storage programs and price and credit supports, 
etc., which limited the supply of wheat at certain tines and raised the 
price to an artificial level. 
In Plate Is Fig. 4 a system of oligopoly is shown where two monopolistic 
competitors participate in the market. It indicates the open or tacit agree- 
ment between two oligopolists represented by two supply curves "sisi" and 
"s2s2" which meet the sane demand curve "dd". Oligopolist I shifts his 
original supply curve "sisl" UD, thereby offering less quantity but gaining 
a higher price. Oligopolist II decreases his original price from "Ep" to the 
final equilibrium price "E" in the effort to share an equal market with his 
competitor. They each offer half of "OH0ECo" at the price "HoE". 
Under the real conditions of the world wheat market after World War I 
this theoretical fact was actually accomplished by the strong monopolistic 
position some governments had gained by influencing wheat production and 
market supply. The example of the two oligopolists in Fig. 4 indicates the 
possible price fixing behavior between important export countries. But this 
picture was only acceptable under the assumption that the trade partners 
sought to maximize their economic gain. 
Political developments led to a relegation of this important basic idea 
to a position of less significance. Fig. 1 shows the influence of these facts 
on the IVA which shares in the aggregate wheat market and their pricing sys- 
tems are indicated by the line "BFE" lying between a maximum (Ma) and minimum 
(Mi) price range. This pictpre is hardly explained by economic theory. The 
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reasons are: (1) Member governments of the 171 do not necessarily seek to 
maximize profits as individual firms usually do. In moot cases welfare and 
political reasons determine the purchase and storage of wheat through public 
agencies. (2) An individual monopolist can set only price or quantity, if 
he intends to maximize his profits. A governmental monopoly can sat both 
at the same time through quota and price fixing, demonstrated by the rva. 
Only governments have the power and resources for such a policy. 
In Fig. 1 the present world -wheat narket situation is presented by an 
intersection of the world demand "dd" and the aggregate wheat supply "ss" 
at an equilibrium price "E". The remaining supply, the carryover "DG", does 
not enter the narket because of available holding actions by governments of 
exporting countries. The Da quantity "CC" is one-fourth to one-third of the 
P 
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IWA- World Trade Available 
Quantity Quantity Supply 
Fig. 1. Present world wheat market. One-third of the traded wheat is pur- 
chased under the IWA to the free world market price lying between 
the maximum and minimum prices of the IWA. 
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present total world trade quantity "1D" in wheat, purchased at the price 
"CT" which is in this instance equal to "DE". Inside the IWA the price is 
allowed to fluctuate between a minimum (Mi) and maximum (Ma) level. When 
the free world market price on the line "DE" moves below or above the "Mi" 
and "ma' lines, the IWA will be fixed at those levels. 
Based an this theoretical fremerfork, the thesis outlines the steps which 
led to the IWA and attempts to relate them to the effects of the agreements 
upon exporting and importing oountries, Particularly, it explains the ad- 
justment of one important European wheat importer, West Germany, to the 
analyzed problem. 
STEPS LEADING TO THL IMA 
Export Countries 
It is the common goal of the IVA to overcome hardships to producers 
caused by burdensome surpluses during some seasons and hardships to consumers 
caused by short supplies during other seasons. Thus the goal of the IWA is 
to introduce an element of stability into the world wheat trade. 
The supply situation looks critical in the present period since the 
heavy wheat demand has diminished in some European and other countries which 
were in desperate need of food after World War II. Table 1 shows the de- 
velopment of mheat production and carryover in the four main exporting coun- 
tries in world wheat market since 1945. 
Rising surpluses led the exporting countries to the necessity of looking 
for markets and making these markets as sure as possible. One solution was 
provided through the International Wheat Agreement. World-wide acceptance 
of such agreement promised to help put the domestic agricultural programs 
Table 1. Wheat production and carryover in U.S.A., Canada, Australia and Argentina in millions of 
bushels, 1945-1956. 
United States2 Canada3 Australia3 Arg2Dtina3 
Year 
: Production : Carryover : Production : Carryover : Production 12=_L:Production : Carryover 
illionn of Bushels 
1945 1,107.6 279.2 316.3 258.1 142.4 11.3 143.6 90.0 
1946 1,152.1 100.1 411.6 73.6 117.3 20.0 206.3 45.0 
1947 1,358.9 83.8 333.5 36.1 220.1 13.3 231.8 40.0 
1948 1,294.9 195.9 331.4 77.7 190.7 26.3 191.0 70.0 
1949 1,098.4 307.3 366.0 102.4 218.2 19.0 189.0 55.0 
1950 1,019.3 424.7 466.5 112.2 134.2 43.8 213.0 15.0 
1951 938.1 399.9 553.6 189.2 159.7 19.4 77.2 20.0 
1952 1,306.4 256.0 701.9 217.2 195.2 16.9 280.5 5.0 
1953 1,173.1 605.5 614.0 383.2 198.0 37.7 227.8 72.0 
1954 983.9 933.5 308.9 601.7 168.6 94.9 282.6 60.0 
1955 
1 
934.7 1,036.2 494.1 499.7 195.6 95.0 192.9 85.0 
19561 997.2 1,033.4 537.8 540.6 130.0 87.0 262.0 42.0 
Source: USDA - Statistical Bulletin No. 159, Agricultnral Marketing Service, "Grain ,Ind Feed 
Statistics," May 1957, pnres 52, 61. 
1 Preliminary. 
2 Period July-December each year. 
3 Year beginning August 1. 
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in export countries on a basis determined by home consumption and a stable 
foreign market. The amount of future exports seemed to be more certain and 
wheat programs could be planned for a longer period. The first I7U absorbed 
the average production from over 10 million United States acres every year 
thus securing a much needed market for a part of the surplus production. 
After the decision to maintain a prosperous agricultural econony, the govern- 
ment of the United States supported the planning and ratification of the 
IWA, hoping that this agreement mould provide a rorkable method of achieving 
the described goals. 
but it must be remembered that the reasons for the planning of the rva 
were not only economic. The IA has to be considered in relation to the 
anticipated foreign policy of the United States, the leading political 'world 
ndwer and leading wheat export country. It is obvious that only political 
causes justify the large sum of subsidy costs mlIich are paid by the United 
States since the start of the first ra in 1949 (Table 2). 
This fact suggests a look into the history of United States assistance 
to the wheat economy. Early governmental intervention stressed orderly mar- 
keting rather than action to encourage production. .After 1933, the United 
States government tried to restore a greater degree of balance between pro- 
duction and home utilization. On the international level Argentina and 
Australia developed, at first, aid programs which led to surpluses. They 
were primarily directed at maintaining and perhaps expanding their wheat 
exports. In contrast, Canadian efforts to aid the wheat producers focused 
upon holding operations: wheat was to be isolated from domestic markets in an 
effort to force prices uprard. Following this development, the assistance 
programs of the main exporters became a more and more important factor in 
Table 2. United States, yearly export payments under the IWA, 1949-56. 
Fiscal year = Export payments under the ra 
1949-50 77,794,567 
1950-51 178,179,517 
1951-52 166,928.526 
1952-53 125,865,268 
1953-54 58,696,561 
1954-55 98,482,077 
1955-56 89,679,957 
$795,626,473 
Source: USDA - Commodity Stabilization Service, Grain Division (Letter of 
June 10, 1957, in the TWA Files, D - 12) Grain Marketing Office, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State College. 
their national budgets. The four overseas countries with wheat surpluses 
spent more than X210 million to aid the producers in coping with the effects 
of the wheat crop of 1938-39, just before Uorld War II. 
But the situation today, some years after this war, is more difficult 
than ever before. Increasing subsidies connected with growing stocks are 
marking the dilemma. Will the TWA show a way for the exporting countries to 
overcome their problems? Is it possible to bring surplus wheat in export 
countries to economical use in import countries at sufficient prices? 
Import Countries 
The purpose of the TWA for importing countries is to provide and to 
assure supplies of wheat at equitable and stable prices. 
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Import countries depend on the fluctuating wheat supply at the world 
market. If these countries are not sure that they can obtain at relatively 
stable prices adequate wheat supplies from abroad over a period of time, 
they tend to grow their own wheat* even though they cannot grow it as cheaply 
as the overseas exporter can. 
Political developments, the sometimes attractive idea of self-suffi- 
ciency, and economic pressure in foreign trade balances introduced again 
and again during the last decades programs of national wheat independency 
regardless of the supply condition at the world market. Often it was a 
question of national existence whether or not domestically produced grain 
was available to feed the people in times of economic and political emergency. 
Historically* protective measures began on a large scale with the Great 
Depression during the 1920's. The major importing countries closed their 
borders through the use of trade barriers which were more or less success- 
ful in isolating domestic markets from those of the world. 3nemployment 
and widespread poverty demanded immediate action; little attention was given 
to the long run problem. 
In an attempt to maintain prices and to support producers, many forms of 
assistance were used. Malenbaum reported: 
Attempts were made to expand demand by stimulating various forms 
of domestic utilization and by subsidizing exports. Prices were to be 
raised by isolating large surpluses from the market mechanism, by 
keeping low-cost producers out of certain markets, and by government 
purchases; efforts were made to reduce distributive costs in order to 
increase the farmers' share of the consumer's dollar. On the cost 
side, fixed charges were reduced, cooperative buying was encouraged. 
Generous loans and grants helped fill the gap created by the low 
prices.' 
a. Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy 1885-1939, p. 12. 
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All these facts, together with growing international insecurity, led to 
the development of a protected national production in every country inde- 
pendent from the world market situation. In addition, high tariffs, milling 
quotas, and political and monetary trade controls brought, especially to 
Europe, a controlled trade system more restrictive than ever before. Only 
Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands allowed free imports at a world market 
price. 
Then came World War II. Acreage, yields, and production in wheat in- 
creased to unexpected levels all over the world and all wheat produced was 
consumed. The following adjustment to normal demand in peaceful times 
created difficult problems. Surpluses in world production built up faster 
than could be handled by a free market mechanism. 
Haw must the large stocks of wheat be used? Which countries must at 
first decrease their production to lower the supply? It would seem that 
high-cost areas should restrict at first to favor production in areas with 
low costs. This means that most importing countries have to cut their home 
production and have to buy the cheaper wheat from abroad. Why do not these 
countries do so? 
One of many possible answers is that their governments fear the influence 
of such radical changes would be more dangerous in the domestic policy of 
their countries than the production of expensive -e eat. This is said in re- 
lation to farm income, highest possible use of agricultural resources inside 
a country, political security, and economic independence in times of emer- 
gency. Theoretical reasons do not fit always in this picture. 
To overcome these problems in importing countries, the in offered its 
help. It should assure that they could buy their needed wheat in guaranteed 
quantities and within a range of fixed prices. The following pages will 
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attempt to show how the rm. was exnected to work and will give a picture of 
the resulta reached in the period under the first and second agreements. 
THE AGREEMENTS 
Goals and Basic Principles 
After some conferences attempting to stabilize conditions in world 
wheat trade before World War II, an effort to overcome the wheat problems 
was made through an "International Vheat Agreement". The first post-war 
Da became effective August 1, 1949. 
Maleabaum described the agreement with the following sentences: 
It guaranteed the export sale in each year of a stipulated volume 
of wheat, primarily by Australia, Canada, and the United States, to some 
40 other countries now on an import basis. Mhile specific import and 
export quotas are assigned to individual countries, there are provisions 
for adjustments to be warranted. The exporters have agreed to sell 
their quotas at a price which is not in excess of a stipulated maximum 
level; importers have also undertaken to pay for their "Agreement" 
ports, prices not below certain minimum levels.' 
This was the first time that governments of so many countries agreed to 
put a large sharer and a very vital one, of their economic activity under an 
international agreement. It is the opinion of some experts that the years 
of successful operation during the period of the first agreement demonstrate 
the real possibilities for international cooneration in the trade of this 
commodity. But in a comparative view it shall be seen later that special 
reasons led to this conclusion, because political matters influenced wheat 
trade more in those years than economic ones. 
''Op. cit., W. Malenbaum, p. 192. 
It is essential to know first some details of the background of the 
so it may be easier to understand the change,. in participation, quotas, and 
prices, which occurred in 1953 and 1956. 
On the basis of the 'WA in 1949 the participating export countries ac- 
counted for approximately 85 percent of the total world exports of wheat. 
The participating import countries accounted for about 65 percent of world 
wheat imports. At the beginning of the agreement, Germany and Japan did not 
participate; their share of 15 percent was added later to the importing 
countries. 
The yearly total of 456 million bushels of wheat under the first In 
VAS approximately one -half of the total 1949 world wheat trade. 
It vas possible for nonmembers to join the agreement later by votes 
of two-thirds of the wheat council, which was established under the IVIA with 
1,000 votes for exporting and 1,000 votes for importing countries. Also, 
there were some escape clauses for both partners: 
An exporting country may be relieved of all or part of its obli- 
gation in a particular crop year by reason of a short crop. An im- 
porting country may be relieved of all or part of its obligations for 
a particular crop year by reason of the necessity to safeguard its 
balance of payments or monetary reserve, (after taking in account the 
opinion of the International Monetary Fund).1 
Provision was also made for any exporting or importing country which 
considers its national security to be endangered by the outbreak of hostil- 
ities to withdraw from the agreement. The trade quantity for each country 
was determined by a process of negotiation; no country was required to buy 
or to sell to a fixed trade partner. All countries were allowed to fulfill 
their guaranteed quantities through private trade channels. 
'USDA, Office of the Secretary, April 25, 1949, "Some Questions and 
Answers Relating to the 1949 In." 
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There have been no important changes of these basic principles through 
the three agreements 1949, 1953, and 1956. However, it may be noticed that 
since 1956 non-member nations are allowed to participate in discussing world 
wheat problems through the World 71heat Council. This especially should make 
it easier for Great Britain to come back in line of the agreement nations. 
Change in Participating Nations 
At first it is of some interest to note the change of nations parti- 
cipating in the IWA (Table 3). 
On the side of exporting countries the addition of Argentina and Sweden 
is important. Argentina did not attend the first and second agreement. At 
those times Argentina suffered lover production due to a favored industrial 
policy and also was engaged in bilateral trade. Today, Argentina tries to 
reach the traditional position again of a strong export country in wheat, and 
it seems the government thought that participating in the IWA served the bast 
interest of the nation. 
On the side of importing countries which participated in the first 
agreement the outstanding factor is that the United Kingdom, the vorldts 
largest importer, did not renew the second and third agreement. The British 
point of view concerning world wheat problems changed during the four years 
of the 1949 agreement and that government participates no longer. The al- 
tered British opinion was the followings In the face of increasing sur- 
pluses one should not put more trade power to governments through agreements 
like the rrA. That is no way to solve the problem& The only possibility to 
bring supply and demand to an equilibrium point is the free and open market 
system. It would take care that the sources for the huge wheat surpluses would 
be reduced. 
Table 3. Transactions in wheat and flour recorded under the IWA 1949-56. 
1,000 Bushels 
," 
19 9 International Wheat A eement : 195 International Wheat A eement : 1 * 
Importing 
Country 
Quota Quantity actually bought )uota Quantity actually bought quota 
nnua . : : Annua 1 : : 
Austria 11,023 11,054 11,008 10,947 10,495 9,185 11.1410 4,955 2,115 3,674 
Belgium 20,209 19,838 20,258 20,089 20,222 23,883 15,204 20,000 12,598 16,535 
Bolivia 2,756 1,448 2,711 2,831 2,801 4,041 1,263 717 3,882 4,042 
Brazil 13,228 1,606 8,079 13,132 13,228 13,227 3,872 7,452 216 7,349 
Ceylon 6,614 4,409 6,614 6,570 6,613 10,288 10,288 5,723 7,622 
Costa Rica 1,213 1,113 1,180 1,113 1,207 1,286 1,324 1,284 1,110 1,470 
Cuba 7,422 6,018 7,422 7,405 7,395 7,422 5,371 7,272 7,422 
Denmark 1,617 1,606 1,674 1,637 1,621 1,837 1,509 1,837 
Dom. Republic 876 719 838 875 871 955 867 946 1,096 1,102 
Ecuador 1,286 1,091 1,294 1,323 1,281 2,388 2,401 2,251 1,215 1,837 
Egypt 14,697 7,905 13,627 14,161 34,844. 14,697 1,887 19 6,710 11,023 
El Salvador 404 482 453 388 400 734 727 729 731 919 
Germany 66,139 31,788 59,372 65,676 66,335 55,115 37,482 54,753 46,758 55,116 
Greece 15,726 15,836 15,220 15,617 13,540 12,360 4,854 12,012 9,655 11,023 
Guatemala 919 417 919 920 920 1,286 1,095 802 805 1,470 
Haiti 1,029 1,018 1,048 1,102 1,029 1,837 1,634 1,848 1,765 2,204 
Honduras 367 -- 230 366 370 734 518 473 420 919 
Iceland 404 -- 23 377 338 404 286 53 40 73 
India 55,116 38,273 55,253 55,052 55,086 36,743 2,647 24,868 19,261 7,349 
Indonesia 3,674 OIMPO 3,618 3,938 3,539 6,246 4,577 5,283 6,350 5,144 
Ireland 10,104 8,080 10,052 10,132 10,232 10,104 2,656 5,959 4,530 5,512 
Israel 5,879 5,461 5,888 5,887 5,894 8,267 5,915 8,413 4,950 8,267 
Italy 40,418 13,017 30,047 36,099 34,582 3,674 2,604 3,674 
Japan 18,372 -- -- 17,328 18,536 36,743 36,945 36,849 36,331 36,744 
Lebanon 2,388 150 2,402 2,464 2,405 2,755 33 2,083 866 2,756 
Jordan -- 2,939 208 
Korea (WOINI *AI* 1,469 1,064 1,422 625 2,205 
Liberia 37 6 36 36 34 73 45 49 48 73 
Mexico 12,860 9,186 12,861 12,859 12,658 14,697 2,945 150 3,967 3,674 
Netherlands 24,802 27,446 22,975 24,938 24,783 24,802 17,219 27,998 15,909 25,721 
New Zealand 4,593 3,046 4,565 4,592 4,592 5,878 5,853 5,78 5,877 5,879 
Nicaragua 331 280 326 328 326 367 356 366 360 367 
Norway 7,716 7,715 7,708 7,724 7,755 8,451 6,826 5,333 8,016 6,614 1:4' 
Table 3 (coml.) 
1 000 Bushels : 19 International Wheat A cement 1 International Wheat A eement : 1 
Importing 
Country 
Quota : quantity actually bought 
Annual) :1949-50 :1950-51 : 1951-52 : 1952-53 
: Quota : 
:(Annual): 
Quantity actually bought : Quota 
1953 -54 1954 -55 : 1955 -56 : Annual) 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Saudi Arabia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Union of S. 
Africa 11,023 
United Kingdom 177,068 
Vatican State 
Venezuela 6,246 
Yugoslavia 
625 
5,512 
7,202 
5,626 
1,837 
4,373 
2,756 
6,430 
Exporting 
Country 
Argentina 
Australia 
Canada 
France 
Sweden 
485 
5,247 
4,523 
5,145 
730 
1,007 
6,431 
626 
5,390 
7,195 
5,372 
1,146 
3,722 
2,122 
6,478 
623 
5,648 
7,199 
5,603 
1,826 
2,204 
2,808 
6,430 6,469 
647 
5,621 
7,203 
5,608 
1,806 
4,482 
2,751 
7,901 8,315 10,274 10,618 
177,012 177,101 177,066 177,070 
*A* 
4,593 5,788 5,397 6,041 
1110110110. *WW1 
Quantity actually sold 
734 
7,348 
8,671 
7,348 
2,572 
9,185 
7,899 
13,227 
I** 
551 
6,246 
3,674 
uota 
651 
676 
8,653 
4,043 
1,451 
9,316 
6,966 
7,633 
551 
6,240 
2,333 
678 674 
729 62 
8,696 8,804 
2,969 4,975 
923 892 
1,620 1,907 
7,110 5,498 
1,102 
7,349 
6,063 
5,179 
3,674 
4,593 
6,981 
7,603 6,052 5,512 
559 551 551 
6,253 6,246 6,246 
3,633 3,733 3,674 
Quantity actually sold 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,246 
88,700 80,805 87,285 71,252 86,673 44,355 27,777 41,512 44,918 29,328 
235,000 135,447 190,883 241,586 231,078 150,842 90,194 109,202 75,650 99,737 
4,089 3,306 3,885 4,085 3,380 338 367 375 363 16,026 
6,232 
United States 253,128 162,560 248,920 255,279 251,137 193,652 106,152 139,510 134,076 128,042 
Totals 580,000 432,120 530,974 572,203 572,268 389,189 225,192 290,601 255,007 293,613 
Source: World Wheat Statistics, issued by The International Wheat Council, Haymarket House, London, S.W.1. 
Volume I, April 1955, pp. 42-46; Volume II, January 1956, Pp. 51-63. 
The Wheat Review, Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, December 1956, pp. 2, 
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C.suota Variations 
The transactions in wheat and flour recorded under the IWA show an 
interesting picture especially when compared with the total quantity of world 
trade in wheat during the same years. The following table (Table 4.) projects 
very clearly the declining trend in IWA trade as a part of the aggregate world 
market. 
Table 4. World and nu transactions in wheat and flour (1,000 bushels), 
1949-57. 
Year Total world 
Actual 
IWA sales IWA quotas 
1949-50 845,950 432,120 580,000 
1950-51 932,776 530,974 580,000 
1951-52 1,065,273 572,203 580,000 
1952 -53 957,792 572,268 580,000 
1953-54 852,539 225,192 389,189 
1954-55 951,659 290,601 389,189 
1955-56 1,016,000 255,007 389,189 
1956-57 mar 0110 293,613 
Sources (1) World Wheat Statistics, Volume I, loril 1955, pp. 25, 42-46; 
waz. 11, January 1956, pp. 37,63. 
(2) The Wheat Review, December 1956, pp. 2, 4-5. 
Far from reaching the total world trade quantity* but also far from the 
agreed quotas, the IWA sales covered only one-fourth of the world wheat trade 
in 1955-5G. An explanation of the continuous decline of the r transactions 
is not always easy. Some countries, like the United Kingdom, refused to par- 
ticilmte farther because of differences in opinion about the economic value 
of such an agreement. 
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Other countries cut their first quotas considerably becaese of rising 
production at home, bilateral agr33ments with non-IWA exporters, or -heat 
receipts through different kinds of support programs (especially by the 
United States government). The general line of these nations can be illus- 
trated by the examples of India, Italy, and Brazil. 
In India it was the main problem of the new independent government in 
1948 to feed the people. The government took the opportunity to get wheat, 
55 million bushels annually under the first La, with the help of the Western 
nations which supported these purchases. Eighty percent of the population 
of this country live in rural areas and villages, and the success or failure 
of the government would he judged by it's agricultural policy. So the 
Indians began their "battle for food" under the first Five Year Plan in 1950. 
During that plan agricultural production increased by ap,roximate1y 20 percent 
as compared with 1949 -50. This improved food situation encouraged the govern- 
ment to allow the export of certain food grains during 1955. India reduced 
her IWA, quota to 7 million bushels in 1956.1 
In Italy the government tried to force a steady development of agricul- 
ture. A 12-year Recovery Program for the undeveloped, mainly agricultural, 
areas in the South went into action in 1950.2 
Although wheat was formerly the major import product, today's production 
is almost sufficient for requirements. In seeking the remainder, priority 
would be given to purchases for payment in clearing agreements or in English 
pounds. So the Italian government reduced its IWA, quotas from 40 million 
1 
Agriculture Abroad, Department of Agriculture, Vol. XI, No. 3, Juno, 1956, 
Ottawa (Canada). 
2lbid, Vol. XI, No. 1, February, 1956 
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bushels in 1949 to three million in 1956 and obtained the rest of what it 
needs through bilateral agreements with Argentina, Turkey, USSR, and the 
United States under Public Law 480. 
The situation in Brazil is characterized by increasing activity on the 
part of the government to develop domestic production. The IWA quota was 
reduced from 13 million bushels in 1949 to 7 million bushels in 1956. This 
indicates that the government's assistance and encouragement to the farmer 
to use his land to better advantage is bearing fruit. The best example is 
indeed wheat productions which has increased by 60 percent in the past five 
years; the yields per acre in the sa-e time by 56 percent. These results 
can be traced directly to the government through guaranteed prices, making 
available mechanized equipment at cost price and a long-term credit program, 
the encouragement to use fertilizers, and better seed selection. In addition, 
the government has continued its program of building increased storage and 
silo facilities and of guaranteed minimum prices for other crops.1 
The examples of these three countries might have shown enough causes 
for declining quotas and declining total demand under the ra since 1949. 
They confirm the opinion among some world wheat experts that the IWA may 
sometime die of malnutrition. 
Price Differences 
The first agreement established a maximum prioe of $1.80 (Basis: No. 1 
Manitoba Wheat at Fort iNilliam/Port Arthur) and a minimum price of S1.50 for 
the first year with downward gradations in the minimum to 01.20 in the fourth 
1 Ibid.* Vol. XI, No. 4, August, 1956. 
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and final year. The maximum remained at .1.3C, for the duration of the agree- 
ment. This price was set surprisingly low in vie u of the than prevailing 
situation and the wheat importing countries, mostly supported by Marshall 
Plan Funds* had reason to find these prices attractive. 
On the other hand* 
It is less clear why the officials of three major exporting coun. 
trios should have been willing to sign a four-year Agreement with a 
price range so far below current levels. For these countries* how- 
ever* a dominant element was certainly fearfear of an early con- 
traction of import markets* fear of increased export competition and 
fear of resulting unbearable strains on their own national wheat.. 
marketing system.' 
Under these circumstances the IWA functioned properly during a period of 
high world market prices* forced by a heavy demand because of the Korean ':`gar, 
bad crops, and because of financial support by exporting nations. The im- 
porters were satisfied; the exporters absorbed their great losses incurred 
an riA sales by their treasuries with the exception of Canada. This situa- 
tion could only happen because in general the exporting nations were wealthier 
than the importing countries. 
But with their huge losses in mind the exporters argued at the tine of 
the negotiation for a new agreement in 1953: 
That the price of wheat should be in accordance alone with the 
farmers' cost of production* regardless of the international factors 
of supply and demand* and that this cost of production is represented 
by the USA parity system of price support.2 
The question is: Who can judge the price? In opposition to the opinion 
of the export countries, the United Kingdom as the largest importer, pointed 
"Helen C. Farnsworth* "Int. wheat Agreements and Problems* 1949-1956," 
The quarterly Journal of Economics* Val. LXX, May, 1953, p. 222. 
2Searle Grain Company, Limited, Grain Market Feature:** Winnipeg* 
Manitoba* May 6, 1953, No. 9, p. 2. 
out that in the light of the current abundant wheat supplies, the price at a 
F1.80 maximum and X1.20 minimum is a fair reflection of the value of wheat in 
conditions of a free market in 1955. 
But the accepted new agreement insisted on a higher price range from 
$2.05 to 01.55 for the three following years. So the United Kingdom refused 
to sign the second rail. It was the conviction of the British government that 
this price range would lead only to more burdensome surpluses and would not 
avoid the basic causes of the world wheat problem. 
One important immediate effect, after deciding upon this price range, was 
recognized: domestic wheat prices were raised and larger wheat plantings en- 
couraged for 1953 and 1954 in a number of wheat importing nations, and also in 
France, an NA exporting country. This encouragement to self-production 
through higher INA prices, together with the lack of dollars brought the 
consequence that several countries reduced their imports under the TWA and 
sought relief under more bilateral agreements. 
Table 1 shows that the opinion of the British government VAS 
The surpluses grew each year. The world wheat crop in 1955 was 7,300 million 
bushels, only slightly below the all -time record. In connection with these 
growing surpluses the opinions about a further need and the level of price 
range of an ra. became more and more different. 
The last year of renewing was 1956. The negotiations were difficult and 
it was only possible to guarantee sales and purchases in an amount of 293 mil- 
lion bushels of wheat in 1955-56. The new maximum and minimum prices, 4.00 
and a.50 a bushel, are only five cents under the 1953 level, despite the 
large stocks which have built up in the meantime. Rut the reduced total 
amount and the absence of the United Kingdom show that these prices were 
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determined more by agreements betwe ©n the monopoly exporters than by a true 
equilibrium between buyers and sellers at the world market. 
Helen C. Farnsworth made a fundamental statement of the problem of an 
advanced price range: 
Advance negotiation of a four year price range for international 
wheat transaction is inevitably risky. At the time such a price range 
is established even the best informed exnerts cannot foresee the gem.. 
liarities of crop weather and the general economic and international 
political developments that will characterize the contract period. 
If the Agreement prices are set too low for a four -year period the 
maximum price will become the fixed price, persistently penalizing 
participating, but not non-participating exporters. If the Agree - 
ment prices are set too high, then the minimum price is likay to 
become the fixed price, penalizing importing countries that take up 
their guaranteed quantities? 
The four-year price range refers only to the first ins 1949-1953. 
These problems make it difficult for an observer of the Pa to judge 
wtrt should be the "riGht" wheat policy for an exporting or for an importing 
country. 
Because it is only the further task of this thesis to examine the facts 
and the points of view of an importing Wheat country, an attempt is made in 
the next chapters to explain the decision of the parliament and the govern- 
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany, the second largest European importers 
as to how the wheat problems in their country were met. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY TS GERMANY 
Agriculture in General 
West Germany has an area of 94,700 square miles, about the size of Oregon. 
It consists of arable land, 35 percent! permanent meadows and pastures, 23 
percent; forests, 28 percent; and non- agricultural, 14 percent. 
10p. cit., Helen C. Farnsworth, pp. 233-234. 
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The farm population is about one-eighth of the total of 52 million 
reoele. The principal agricultural !)roduct is livestock velich -sakes up 
three- fourths of the value of the total agricultural output. The main. 
grains are rye, wheat, oats, and barley. Potatoes and sugar beets are also 
importert. 
Since World War II agriculture has revived and has surpassed its pre - 
Sr output. It is now thought to be producing about 70 percent of the coun- 
try's reluirements. The frmily type farm is predominant. The average size 
is 17 acres and in the South often badly fragmmted. In this view, a main 
problem is a sound land consolidation and the development of larger farm 
units. Mechanization and advanced methods are satisfactorily developed on 
farms larger than the average. Fertilizer input is high above the European 
avers- 
The climate in most parts is favorable for intensive ar,riculture and high 
yields, but it does not alervs produce best qualities, i.e. in rbeat. 
Economic Situation- 
The recovery of the German economy is finished. Aided by a stable 
political situation and the absence of significant labor disputes, the econom- 
ic expansion proceeds at a rapid pace. Home investment, consumption, and 
foreign trade are at a high level. The economic development might be seen in 
the gold and dollar reserves held by the German government. The amount ex- 
perienced an increase from the year 1951 with 357 million to 1954 with $1,503 
million and to December 31, 1956, with t3,341 million, the highest amount held 
1USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, FAS-M.9, July, 1956; FATP-1-57, 
January 4, 1957; FATP-16-57, April 25, 1957. 
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in a foreign country. This strong payment position has put Germany in the 
forefront of countries favoring easy convertibility and the rejection of 
quantitative import controls. The reasons that this should not immediately 
include agricultural products on a broad front are explained in the following 
pages. 
Other information is needed to understand the economic policy in Carmany 
since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. 
The food consumption level is about 2,950 calories per person per day 
which is a little less than in pre-war times. Consumption of high protein 
products and fruits is increasing, grain and potato use is going down. The 
dependence on agricultural imports is about the same percentage-wise as the 
pre-war figure for the same territory, although the population has increased 
by more than 10 million in 10 years. Imports today provide one.third of the 
calorie value of the food supply for West Germany. The country is the world's 
third largest importer of agricultural products. The principal goods are 
wheat, feed grains, cotton, oils and fats, coffee, wool, and tobacco. Hops, 
some kinds of meat products, and beer are only minor agricultural exports. 
Germany trades manufactured goods which are produced by highly developed 
industries for a large part of its food and raw material requirements. 
At this point it is the place to raise some questions which go deep into 
the problem of the TWA: Why does not Germany buy wheat in law...production-cost 
countries to give the millions of people in its industries the cheap food re . 
source which they need? Why is the DNA unable to convince this importing 
country of its advantages by taking more wheat under the agreement? The 
next discussions will make this clearer. 
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Bread Grain Production 
Grain is grown in all parts of West Germany. Rye and wheat are the major 
types. 3ecause a large part of the German people like to eat rye bread, the 
cultivation of this grain is very important, Another reason that rya takes 
the first place in grain production in Germany is that the yields of rye are 
higher on poorer soils than are the yields of wheat. Rye covers all tho less 
fertile areas in the North, East, and mountain regions, while wheat is cul- 
tivated on better soils with remarkably high yields. All wheat types are 
soft, and there are significant differences in quality due to climate con- 
ditions. These gradually influence the protein content from the North to 
the South. The production figures are shown in Table 5 indicating the im- 
portance of rye and wheat in German agriculture. 
Germany ranks first in rye production in Europe and follows Italy, France, 
Spain, and Yugoslavia in wheat production. These four countries are growing 
more surplus wheat from year to year providing at the same time export markets 
to other European countries which need to import wheat. 
Grain is the basic crop of nearly all German farming systems. It is 
the standard plant for most rotations with changing shares from 33-66 percent 
of the planted acreage on a farm. This part of grain in each rotation pro- 
vides some advantages; as better labor management throughout the year, using 
of effective machinery for planting and harvesting, and using the winter mois- 
ture through fall seedings. The other crops like potatoes, sugar beets, 
clover, alfalfa, etc., must have groins sharing in their rotation to prevent 
diseases and unhealthy soil conditions. Another important reason for grain 
seeding is the big demand for strawfor manure production. The fertility of 
28 
Table 5. Rye, wheats acreac, yields, production in Germany 0. 1935..1939 
and 19464949 average, 1954-1966 annually. 
19364959 : 1946-1949 s 1954 s 1966 1966 
Acreage (1,000 acres) 
.41=Wil 
Rye 4,080 3,480 3,780 3,643 3,864 
Wheat 2,786 2,283 2,756 2,876 2,830 
Yield per acre in bushels 
Rye 29.2 28.4 42.7 37.8 40.1 
Wheat 33.2 29.5 38.9 43.0 45.1 
Production (1,000 bushels) 
Rye 110,000 93,900 181,330 137,300 147,040 
Wheat 92,403 87,420 106,230 123,570 127,500 *, 101.100.0 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Circular, FG 15-56. 
many of the European soils depends largely on the permanent addition of or- 
ganic ulbstance to avoid too heavy diminution of fertility under the humid 
climate of Northern Europe with high moisture content in the air and rainfall 
during the whole year. Most farms have both field production and livestock 
raising, feeding or milking. This requires a large investment in houses and, 
buildings, machinery, fertilizer, nmapaver, and improved seeds and breeds. 
At first one should look for the number of farms connected with grain pro.. 
duction in comparison with tho total number of farms in Test Germany (Table 6). 
Table 6. Number of farms producing grain, West Germany, 1939 mad 1949. 
Total 
1939 
1949 
2,009,743 
1,078,090 
ith grain : 
1,812,306 
1,792,031 
With rye 
1,445,073 
1,413,340 
With wheat 
1,085,734 
1,235,669 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1055, pp. 128 and 131, reporting census data. 
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The table shows a slight decrease in total numbers of farms as oompared 
to the pre-war level, but an increase of wheat planting farms. This might be 
explained by the introduction of new varieties which grow on poorer soils and 
through the better price which is paid for Wheat. 
The olose connection of grain and livestock production in the mixed farm 
system is significant for the larger number of German farms. In this view the 
straw production wins an important position in the considerations of farmers' 
planning. 
Table 7. Number of farms producing livestock, West Gerreny,1939 and 1949. 
t With cattle t 
Total s With horses g and milk cows s With hogs : With sheep 
1939 2,009,743 615,710 
1949 1,978,090 605,703 
411.11111110011 
1,554,789 1,585,672 139,518 
1,559,268 1,601,945 532,758 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1955, p. 131. 
The decreasing number of farms with horses indicates not only the intro. 
duotion of tractors but at the same time the converting of oats acreage to 
some other use, mainly for wheat and cash crops. Especially for small farms 
with a higher percentage of livestock, the yields and absolute amounts of 
straw are important factors. This straw is used to strew in cow-sheds and 
pig.styi, etc., to keep the animals clean and warm, but the main reason is 
to make manure. In a humid climate, where biological transfers are too quick, 
the manure is vitally important for high fertility of the soils. To this 
question the European farmer has to pay more attention, because there are all 
possible soils in use with regard to the dense and growing population an that 
continent. Sinoe most European agrioultures are highly intensive in view of 
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soil production (per acre basis), it seems that there is no way to overlook 
the importance of natural manure even though much work is connected with its 
production. This means the time and labor for harvesting, transportation, 
storage, and strewing of straw and then loading, transportation, and distri- 
bution of the manure. 
The average straw crop in Germany shows high figures, outstanding through 
sufficient rain and intensive use of nitrogen, as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Wheat straw crops, West Germany; average yield per hooter in kg; 
total in metric tons, 1952-54. 
Wheat Average k a s Total production in metric tons(t) 
1952 4020 4,796,446 
1953 4120 4,755,184 
1954 4100 4,533,103 
Sources Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1955, pp. 142-143. 
Conversions (a kg a 2.205 pounds 
a ha a 2.471 acres 
a t s 0.984 long ton or 2204.62 pounds). 
After the second "World War the grain production quickly exceeded the ore - 
war level. Beside the price incentive, which shall be discussed later, the 
most determining factor of the decision to put emphasis on own high grain 
production at most German farms was the possibility of mechanization and re« 
duction of labor in this field of agricultural production. 
Grain production is sometimes referred to as "wares extensive". The 
mechanical development of grain ,production reduced -01a share of wages for 
planting and harvesting grain to a relatively unimportant point. So the ex- 
pense gap between grain and other field crops, like potatoes, sugar beets, 
feed grains and grasses, clover, alfalfa, etc., is wider than ever before. 
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And it seers that the technical development of grain production will take the 
first place in efficiency and cheapness in tM future too. The consequence 
is that grain production from this point of view will increase or at least 
be equal to the present acreage and yields. If other agricultural production 
fields with hih demand of hand labor would suffer under increasing wages, 
grain production will be relatively invulnerable. The emphasis on rages for 
agricultural workers is important because of the competition of agriculture 
and industry at the labor market. The neighborhood of both is so close all 
over the country that the farmers have to virtually match industrial rages 
to get a sufficient number of workers. 
Wheat Policy 
The Post-World War I Period until 1925. After the war, Germany had in 
her changed area a population of around 65 million people. Ten million metric 
tons of bread grain were used to meet the demand of the country. Half of this 
amount was rye, and half was wheat, with the post.wwur tendency in favor of the 
latter. The German farmers produced rye in a sufficient quantity; an occa- 
sional surplus went into the export or was fed to livestock. But the wheat 
supply shored a deficit from one to two million metric tons, varying from year 
to year* which had to be covered by imports. This was in line with the pre. 
war practice* as Germany was one of the foremost wheat importing countries in 
Europe. 
The German wheat production did not go untouched out of the changed world 
situation after the war. Before 1914, import duties on grain and other agri. 
cultural products were high enowh to secure the domestic producer a suffi- 
cient price level for his wheat. At the beginning of the war, these tariffs 
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were abolished. Partly because of provisions in the Versailles Treaty, they 
were not reestablished until after the pos year inflation period. Thas, in 
1923 through 1926 domestic wheat prices were considerably below the world 
price. Two main reasons provided this result. 
First, the competition of rye and potatoes with wheat for human consump- 
tion introduced a price -depressing influence quite independent of foreign 
supply; secondly, technical progress, thorough soil preparation, efficient 
crop rotation, certified seed, and application of large quantities of manure 
and artificial fertilizers enabled Gerl-any to rank among the countries with 
the highest yields per acre. This was in spite of the generally moderate 
quality of the soils used for wheat. The average yield per acre increased 
from 1894-98 with 23 bushels to 30 bushels in 1925. 
The described depressed price situation led to the first state interven- 
tion, which used first of all import tariffs to restrict foreign competition. 
This arras the starting; point for an active agricultural policy by the govern- 
ment after the war, the effects of which are described on the next pages. 
Malenbaum categorized the various protection measures in three groups: 
(1) Simple tariffs (from around 1880-1929); (2) Supplementary measures 
directed toward making the tariff barriers more effective (from 1929 to about 
1934); (3) Complete market and foreign trade controls (from 1934 into the war 
years). This list became significant for most national economies in ehlrope. 
The Post-Inflation Period until 1933. This period of German wheat policy 
Was determined by tariffs and supplementary measures of quotas and regulations 
to overcome the difficult problems of the economy. Germany then found itself 
involved in several pressing difficulties, for exn,nple, the inability to bal- 
ance the trade budget, disequilibrium in the international account, instability 
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of currency and banking, agrarian distress, unemployment of urban workers, and 
political instability. 
Hard pressed by these problems most countries in Europe evolved programs 
leading to "economic nationalism." Those policies were applied with special 
vigor to wheat, which led as a consequence to an expansion of wheat production 
and to the reduction of Europe's imports. To buy as little from the outside 
world as possible to improve the balance of the national budget was the de- 
clared policy of that time. 
Agricultural distress beca:re universal in Europe and around the world. 
Low prices aad high costs coexisted. In Germany, one of the major items in 
high cost had been the oppressive rate of interest; since the war the country 
changed from a creditor to a debtor, lacking sufficient cheap long-term capi- 
tal. 
Increasing taxation, oppressive rate of interest and wholesale prices 
raised the living cost. Rural wages increased despite large scale urban un- 
employment. The index of farm wages on a prewar base rose from 116 in 1924 -25 
to 154 in the average of 1927 to 1930, while the index of wheat prices in the 
same years averaged only 119. High fixed cost tended to favor greater produc- 
tion per acre in order to spread the cost aver a larger number of units. Oadp 
exception in the increasing cost of production means was artificial fertilizer. 
It was much cheaper than wheat in comparison to the prewar average. This fact 
induced the farmers to raise the yield per acre as much as possible by large 
applications of the cheapest item--in this instance, artificial fertilizers. 
During the great depression unemployment rose to extraordinary propor- 
tions. The consumption level, especially for the more expensive wheat prod» 
ucts, decreased. The food consumption of wheat, after having increased by 
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approximately 25 million bushels from 1924 to 1929, declined by about 40 mil- 
lion bushels from 1929 to 1933. The considerable reduction in the purchasing 
power of the population was undoubtedly the major cause of this decline in 
total consumption. But some other reasons attributed also to the reduction of 
per capita bread consumption, which was 10 percent below the prewar level in 
1930. Listed here are reduction in manual labor, the low demand of the smaller 
standing army, a larger proportion of urban population, and a larger flour and 
bread yield per unit weight of grain. 
The one-sided tariff protection given to grain had led to a considerable 
extension of the area sawn, particularly the mheat acreage. The general duty 
on wheat in Germany increased from 1926 with 22.68 coats per bushel to 383.40 
cents per bushel in 1935. 
even though these tariff rates increased steadily, it was found neces- 
sary as early as 1929 to proceed to direct control of the markets for wheat 
(and rye) by milling and storage quotas. 31ending of imported and domestic 
wheats and the limitation of flour imports were the Lam controls most often 
applied; sometimes the mills were only permitted to use imported wheat for 
less than 5 percent of their output. This left no possibility for choice in 
the kind of flour, it was merely an order to use up domestic wheat. Other 
compulsory milling formulas have driven mills to various methods of improve- 
ment and conditioning of domestic wheats. Also, the mills had learned to 
produce better flours at higher extraction. For customary uses in bread- 
making flour could be produced with a 75 percent extraction which was equiva- 
lent to prewar flour of 70 percent. Higher extraction meant, at the sere time, 
reduction of millfeed, but this was in conformity with the program, since sup- 
plementary feeding stuffs could be imported cheaper than wheat. 
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The protective measures raised the domestic wheat prices substantially 
above the world level. From 35 marks per metric ton in 1925, the duty on 
wheat was raised to 350 marks in 1934j this was about five times the level of 
world wheat prices at that time. These high prices, secured through a policy 
in which landlords end peasants felt confident, brought about the expansion of 
wheat acreage in the depression period to an unbelievable level. 
The price relationship between grains and other flour products favored 
further the increase in the high proportion of area devoted to grain, partiou 
laxly in 1931.34. The expansion of the wheat area was entirely at the expense 
of rye and oats. The seeded area in rye deolined by 3.6 percent, and the 
acreage in oats by 10.6 percent from 1929 to 1933. The limitation of the 
German wheat production at that time was given only by the scarcity of good 
soils. So the 1933 wheat area reached the all time peak through this ex 
tremely favorable price and price relationship level. 
The wheat yields averaged 32.3 bushels per acre from 1931 to 1935, more 
than two and a half times the average yield in the United States. Increases 
in yields lowered the dependence on foreign supplies. From 1929-30 through 
1933.34, the great decline in the amount of wheat used for human consumption 
was reinforced by the low rate of population growth. So the expanding course 
of wheat production was in contrast to the contraction of the total utilise« 
tion of wheat in those years. At the end of this period self -sufficiency was 
nearly reached. Nhile in 1927.28 around 45 percent of the wheat consumed was 
imported, in 1932.u33 Germany imported lees than 3 percent and added to the 
carry-over twice the amounts of net imports. 
The "economic nationalism" was already established in regard to wheat as 
a consequence of the depression and the economic development since the war. 
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In that situation the National Socialists took power in Germany in 1933 and 
lifted the started methods to a rigid system Which was applied to the whole 
economy. Plan and self.aufficiency bosuns the slogan on the political plat- 
form. 
The German Wheat Policy 1933 to World War II. The regulations of agri- 
cultural markets, which had started with wheat and rye during the depression, 
became wider and wider in scope under the new political regime. The develop. 
ment reached its peak and logical conclusion in the market legislation of 1933 
aad 1934. All the earlier measures were coordinated into a uniform scheme. 
It followed that the agricultural markets had to be operated with prices fixed 
by decree. 
The main motives of the introduced policy were, first the assurance of an 
adequate supply of agricultural products, secondly the protection of producers 
and consumers against excessive price fluctuations and thirdly the guarantee 
of a "just" price to the producers. Such a far going aim was reached by a 
planned control of the markets through a powerful organization. This Food 
Cartel (REICHSNAEHRSTAND) included all individual farmers, their corporations 
and cooperations, all private merchants of agricultural products, the ex- 
ohanges, and all the processing industries. 
The described organized basis of the new German agricultural policy was 
the essential pre-condition for the effective further control of the grain 
markets; wheat, rye, and feed grains. A quota system fixed the exact amounts 
of both domestic and foreign grain to be bought by the individual mills. Not 
only the methods of purchase and processing, the schedules of delivery and 
prices of flour were prescribed in detail to the mills, but also the charges 
to be borne by the mills. 
37 
To set a "just" price, a whole battery of measures, consisting of mini- 
mum prices to be paid to producers, compulsory storing of wheat by millers, 
and contingents for mill operations was put in force in the fall of 1933. 
Fixed prices to producers were introduced la 1934. These prices varied acs 
cording to region and month of delivery. In 1935-36, there were twenty dif.- 
ferent price regions for wheat* 
Fixed prices were also extended to flour, millfeed, and bread. All 
margins for the sales of wheat, wheat products, and bread, from producers to 
millers, wholesalers, retailers, and customers, were fixed in detail. Flour 
prices were based on the ash content, established for basic types. Type 790 
for wheat flour and type 997 for rye flour. For all other types premiums or 
discounts mare prescribed. 
wines 1934 the yearly contingents of the mills were subdivided into 
monthly quotas. Fulfillment was controlled by sealing the mill products with 
special seals which could be procured only from the Association of Rye and 
wheat Mills. The regulation was directed toward eliminating gluts in the flour 
market in the fall, and thus served as a link in the ohain of contingents and 
fixed prices. A similar effect was reached by requiring the mills to keep in 
store continually twatwelfths of their yearly output. Also delivery of bread 
grains by producers was fixed by quotas, to insure an even flow of grains 
throughout the year. 
This regulation of the demand side was accompanied on the supply side by 
an equally strictly organized association, controlling all people engaged in 
the sale of grain. Prices are decreed for each region, with the national ay.. 
*rage in excess of 42.00 per bushel every year after 1933. With respect to 
demand, this central organization calculated the domestic requirements a year 
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in advance; it then distributed the required production to each of the grain 
regions into which Germany was divided. The minimum prices for wheat and rye 
from 1933 -.very soon replaced by fixed prices in the fall of 1934. The latter 
were introduced primarily to protect the producer, but the orotection of the 
consumer became later the main issue. The fixed prices varied according to 
region and month of delivery. 
But the elaborate control of marketing had never gone so far as directly 
to influence production itself. The agricultural planning strictly refrained 
from imposing any direct injunction upon the sowing plans of the individual 
producer. So it could happen that the glutting of the wheat market in 1932-34 
as well as the strengthening of the prices of rye and oats brought about a 
set-back in the develoament of the wheat area. By 1936 the wheat area had 
lost nearly half of the gain made from 1927 to 1933. While the recession in 
the winter wheat area from 1933 to 1933 was comparatively moderate (6.1 per. 
cent), the spring wheat area was contracted by not less than 47.8 percent 
from 1932 to 1936. The regions with the poorer soils, less favorable climate, 
and larger acreage gains in the preceding period, lost a larger portion of 
their wheat area than the better soils. 
In contrast to this decreasing wheat production, the per capita food con. 
sumption of wheat regained a small part of its loss as a consequence of the 
increasing employment and political security in that period. 
These faots avoided the hope of the government to reach again self-suf 
ficiency in wheat after the record year of 1933. Early in 1937 it was ap- 
parent that there would be a shortage of wheat in Germany before the end of 
the cereal year 1936-37. Therefore, come 35 million bushels of reheat were 
ported (about 18 percent of the total requirements) during 1937. The estimates 
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of self-sufficiency were based on the Iwo record crops of 1932 and 1933, but 
four unsatisfactory harvests followed, Bad weather and declined area sown 
were the resin causes. To avoid further drain of foreign currency the requi- 
sitioning of all 'wheat and rye fcr hump consumption only was ordered. From. 
October, 1938, onward potato starch flour must be mixed nith Aneat flour to a 
minimun share of four per 
This development reestablished Germany as a deficit country in wheat, as 
the next table shows (Table 9). But the food cartel (Reichsneehrstand) did 
succeed in bringing Germany close to the goal of self-sufficiency for the 
agriculture as a whole. An average ratio of 96.5 percent nns reached during 
the years 1934-39. 
The Post World War II Period, The situation after the last mnr nas 
changed completely to the pre.wnr conditions. Mealy production and °assume» 
tion of wheat determining factors in Germany wore altered, Teraitory and 
wheat acreage of the Federal Republic were no longer identical nith the fig- 
ures of prewwar statistics of Germany. The number lead composition of popula- 
tion, consumption habits and trade practices changed to a large extent. 
All these reasons, which are explained more in detail in the following 
pages, established post -war Germany as a large-scale importer, second only 
to the United Kingdom. Seeking for possibilities to secure the food require - 
ments for its country, the German government joined the IWA, at first under 
the sovereignty of the Western Occupation Powers. But political developments 
and increasing wheat supplies at the world market brought some other points 
into consideration-which altered the mentioned point of security in different 
directions and alternatives, how to reach this goali 
West Germany today produces about two.. thirds of its total food require. 
ments. The largest deficit is in wheat, fats, and oils. At present levels of 
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Table 9. Wheats acreage, imports, consumption, population, Germany 1922-37. 
Year : 
Wheat acreage : Wheat imports : 
(million acres): (million bushels) : 
Rheat consumption : 
(bushel per capita): 
Population 
(million) 
1922-23 3.40 37.5 2.36 61.95 
1923-24 3.65 30.7 2.37 62.36 
1924 -25 3.62 80.1 2.84 62.77 
1925-26 3.84 57.2 2.87 63.18 
1926 -27 3.96 91.6 3.00 63.88 
1927 -28 4.32 88.5 3.19 64.20 
1928-29 4.27 77.7 3,16 64.56 
1929-30 3.95 47.9 3,02 64.93 
1930-31 4.40 31.1 2.61 65.29 
1931 -32 5,36 23.2 2.72 65.59 
1932-33 5.63 5.0 2.71 65.88 
1933-34 5.73 4.6 2.70 66.18 
1934-35 5.43 10.1 2.73 66.62 
1935-36 5.21 0.3 2.87 67.11 
1936-37 5.15 31.8 2.98 67.43 
Sources Hevesy, Paul de* World Wheat Plannim.. and Economic Planning in 
General, p. 488. 
domestic production mad consumption, Germany needs about 100 million bushels 
of wheat annually from abroad. The emphasis in wheat imports is to bring in 
hard wheat for mixing with the soft wheats crown in Germany or obtained under 
bilateral agreements from other countries. German importers tend to look to 
Canada for their nremium quality and premium priced wheat (7anitoba 1 and 2) 
and to the United States for "good average" qualities. There has been some 
criticism of the quality of certain American wheat shipments, a factor which 
might be observed in the declining shipment of first quality wheats from the 
United States to tilurope. 
Since the end of the 19th century Germany has always had a shortage in 
bread grain, esnecially in wheat, the consumption of which became more and 
more important. The share of wheat imports in West Germany's foreign trade 
is shoran in the next table (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Total grain and flour in value percentages of total West German 
imparts, 1961.-64. 
1951 1962 1955 1954 
Grain and Flour 
Wheat (share) 
12.3 
7.1 
12.0 
4.8 
7.7 
4.2 
8.7 
5.4 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1955, p. 2780 
The distribution of wheat imports by source varied. In the years follow'. 
ing World War II--years of large scale United States aid programs -the United 
States supplied practically all of Germany's requirements in wheat until 1949. 
But with the German recovery and the return of the control of the foreign trade 
to a German government, the United States' share declined significantly. But 
it still stood far ahead of the pr ewar level. The next table khans the im- 
ports of wheat and indicates the increasing shares of other countries compared 
with the United States (Table 11). 
The year 1954 shows the largest share coming from "other countries". 
These countries were Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey, Bungary, USSR, Syria. 
But the shift from United States supplies to other countries (Table 11), 
also indicates the lack of dollars to pay for American products. Caused by 
the unequal trade balance between the United States and West Germany, it 
seems to be a serious problem for all trade in the future between dollar and 
non -dollar areas, that the American market is not open enough few foreign 
competition. That would be the only way for countries in debt to the United 
States to pay their obligations. The next table shows this picture very 
clearly in comparison of the United States and West Germany (Table 12). 
As long as such great differences are continued in foreign trade balance 
it must be expected that Germany will seek for non-dollar wheat supply if 
Table 11. West Germany: Imports of wheat by source, average 1934-38, annual 1949-54. 
Year : Total : U.S.A. : Canada $ Argentina : France : Sweden : Australia : Others 
Average 
1934-381 24,741 2,050 
19492 89,424 89,027 
19504 63,359 40,302 
19514 101,219 69,936 
19524 77,912 45,544 
19534 68,075 32,481 
19544 123,403 28,546 
4,927 
12 
--3 
7,267 
22,74 8 
19,664 
22,919 
1,000 bushels 
5,725 489 
37 ...-.3 
7,071 4,042 
5,491 8,399 
168 1,968 
347 6,478 
21,855 13,997 
450 
9 
5,127 
717 
2,185 
2,387 
8,896 
1,347 
---3 
---3 
6,279 
1,162 
2,930 
5,946 
9,753 
339 
6,817 
3,130 
41138: 3,7 8
21,244 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Trade - Statistical Handbook, USDA Stat. !3u1. No. 179, August 1956, p. 29. 
1 
Germany within its 1937 frontiers 
2United States - United Kingdom Forces of Occupation only 
3If any, included with "Others" 
4The Federal Republic of Germany 
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Table 12. Foreign trade, United States - West Germany, in million dollars, 
1964-1966. 
U.S. Exports to Germany $ 
4 
German Exhorts to II.S. 
1954 1966 1954 1966 
Agricultural 4 266.8 4; 241.9 4 26.9 * 24.0 
Other 216.6 345.2 260.7 338.3 
Grand Total 483.4 537.1 277.6 362.3 
Sources Foreign Agricultural Circular, July 1966 M9. 
wheat is available in non-dollar countries. The discussion before shows that 
it would be no serious problem to find wheat without risking scarce dollar 
amounts& This is true especially in those countries where there is a strong 
demand for manufactured goods which Germany can deliver. Because wheat is the 
largest item in basic agricultural imports, the °ha°e of a delivery country 
means at the same time the opening of an export market for the industrial 
goods of German factories. This determines employment and increasing national 
income. A careful selection of wheat resources is therefore an important task 
of German economic policy. Going the most profitable way in fulfilling the 
import food requirements of the country is the main goal. 
Trade Practices. With the return of most of the sovereign powers to a 
German government in 1950 and with the accomplishment of a currency reform 
and general economic stabilization, there was a gradual relaxation of govern- 
mental controls in the whole economy, which had been established in a high 
degree of finances sinoe 1933 and during the war. 
But soon it was obvious that a complete rejection of all controls in the 
agricultural section would bring serious problems, economical and political 
ones. It proved impossible to open the border for the free agrioultural 
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imports because the German farmers, too long under protective walls, could 
not compete under free world market conditions. It will require a long 
period of time to give the whole rural population an efficient education 
through extension, equipments market experiences, etc., to bring the general 
cost of production to a competitive level at the world market. In addition* 
there are more problems through different levels of production cost in many 
production areas caused by differences in soil, surface formation, climate, 
altitude, farm size* fragmentation* etc.* which make the situation difficult 
and complex for each German government* friendly or unfriendly to free 
international competition. 
So* although Germany has, to a large extent, restored a free market 
economy and although all direct regulations of production and consumption 
have been abolished, agriculture thus continues to be protected in signifi- 
cant degree and with a system of great technical efficiency. 
This system works without acreage or bushel allotments for wheat inside 
the country but it fixes prices within a range which is adjusted and renewed 
every year by the government. The price range is determined by quality varia- 
tions and the expected amount and cost of domestic production. Commercial 
firms do the actual buying and selling, but under strict control. Since the 
introduction of this price system the level of returns from wheat production 
has been always high enough to secure the farmer a sufficient and stable in- 
come. Income fluctuation through climate and weather factors are reduced in 
these areas under humid influences by the ocean and gulf stream. 
The "Order-in.Market" legislation permits the German government a wide 
field of authority to implement measures towards planning and regulating the 
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imports of grain and feedstuffa, sugar, milk and milk products, fats and oils, 
livestock and meat. 
The foreign trade of wheat is nominally in the hands of private traders, 
but a government controlled "Import and Storage Agency" (Einfuhrd.und 
Vorratstelle) has the power to take over all imported wheat at the frontier. 
The importer is paid there according to the world market level, including a 
trade margin. Then the importer is required to re-purchase the grain at a 
fixed price, equal to the domestic price level. In addition to this price 
manipulation, there is a year to year changed quantity limitation for wheat 
imports according to the domestic needs. 
This legal power of the central agency enables the state also to equalize 
prices of imported wheat under the La and outside the agreement. All wheat 
coming into the country will be traded only under one price level, directed 
by the government. When necessary, a system of subsidies and levies paid out 
of tax money is used to finance these agencies. 
The consequence of such regulated trade policy is that only that quantity 
will be imported which the government estimates will meet the home demand. 
This system makes sure at the same time that no price change at the world 
market can influence the domestic price level. The producer, inside Germany, 
is secured against supply from countries with law production costs or against 
countries which subsidize their export wheat to an uneconomical level apart 
from price subsidies in their native production to raise this wheat. So, 
no foreign wheat supply can influence crop planning and the income of German 
wheat growers, protected by the described measures of their government. 
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Wheat Consumption 
The par.-capita bread consumption is below the pre -war level. This 
coincides with a world wide observation in countries with increasing standards 
of living. It can be attributed to reduction in manual labor, to a larger 
proportion of urban population, to a larger flour and bread yield per unit 
weight of grain, to changes in taste, and to a higher bargaining power of the 
mass of people under near full employment. Although there are some changes 
from rye bread to wheat products in Germanys the decrease in grain consumption 
appears inevitable. The next table shows the consumption figures of some 
basic foods since the wear (Table 13). 
The table signifies some outstanding changes in population and the amount 
of consumption. The population has increased from 41,200,000 people pre.evar 
to 51,951,000 in 1955 on the area of the Federal Republic. That is mainly the 
result of the influx of refugees and expellees from the Eastern parts of 
former Germany. These parts were at the same time the surplus food-producing 
areas, and their loss caused the serious food shortage after the war and the 
high import demand of Nest Germany today. Yet, the total area of the Federal 
Republic is just under 95,000 square miles or slightly over half the area of 
Germany in the boundaries of 1937, but the population numbers more than three- 
fourths of the former people and totals now 52 million. 
Whereas the average imports to Germany in 1934-38 were 6,733,000 metric 
tons annually, the import demand in 1954 of the Federal Republic alone was 
33,585,000 metric tons. The figures record the significant increase in the 
absolute amount imported for consumption. At the same time it is to be ob- 
served that the expansion of wheat consumption with the improvement in the 
level of living necessitated some displacement of domestically produced rye 
Table 13. Estimated food conaumption level in West Germany, per year and person, pre-war average, 
1947-55 yearly. 
: Population : 
Year : (1 000) : (as flour 
Grain 
Mr==.1231111111===== 
: Potatoes : Fruit : 3eat : link : : Total calories per d 
in kilograms) 
pro war 41,200 113 25 16C 47 52 141 8 2,985 
75 1947-48 48,100 10 15 185 46 20 3 2,375 
1948-49 49,050 134 20 205 38 24 - 79 4 2,590 
1949-50 49,520 119 23 186 55 31 103 5 2,690 
1950-51 50,050 102 26 172 70 37 118 8 2,805 
1951-52 50,470 101 27 163 58 38 123 8 2,706 
1952-53 50,900 100 25 159 75 41 130 8 2,830 
1953-54 51,500 98 26 160 74 43 132 9 2,885 
1954-55 51,950 97 27 158 77 45 129 10 2,935 
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
FAS-14-7 
Page 10, June 1956 
.1.111IMMI1011111111. we+ 
Table 14. West German Economic Development, 
(Index data: 1950 100) 
1951-1954. 
hr 
1951 1952 1953 $ 1954 
Trade total 114 123 134 139 
Food goods 109 116 124 128 
Tobacco and cigarettes 103 111 116 118 
Textiles 112 113 120 122 
Furnitures 136 141 171 173 
Radios, TV's 112 119 132 137 
Cars 117 140 155 163 
Books, newspapers 112 126 140 146 
Art, theater, movies 127 145 160 166 
Industrial production 119 128 159 156 
Employment 109 112 116 122 
Sourcet Statistisches Jahrbuch 1955, pp. 48, 50, and 200. 
to other purposes than bread production. So, at the time grain consumption 
per ca:A.ta is decreasing the German total vrheat demand and consumption re.. 
rain very strong. 
The decreasing carbohydrate consumption of grain products and potatoes 
caused or was the consequ.enee of increasing protein consumption after the 
war, although the prewar level in meat and milk is not reached yet. But the 
increase in German fruit irnorts and consumption over the vast few years has 
been extraordinary. The use of citrus fruits rose from 12 pounds per capita 
before the war to bout 20 pounds in 1953. 
The shift in consumer habits is most remarkable since normal economic 
conditions have been restored to post-war Germany. It seems that this 
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development will continue in the future, as tha exarmle of the U.S.A. has 
proved. Another nr,7unantation of the connection of decreasing Grain con- 
sumption and increasing standard of living shows the development of the 
turnover in some selected German trade enterprises fixed by index numbers, 
as indicated in Table 14. 
Agricultural Support Programs 
The agricultural policy of the 7est German government was always posi- 
tive in providing protective measures to the producer. The methods adopted 
for agricultural protection, aside from the import controls just described, 
include fixed producer prices for grains and sugar beets, maximum consumer 
prices for bread, sugar and milk, and market regulations for sugar, milk and 
rape seed. 
Concerning wheat, the government established fixed Prices which gave 
the producers enough incentive to keep their wheat -,creage, to use high 
inputs of fertilizer, to buy modern machinery for Grain production, and to 
plant as much wheat as their rotation system would allow. The next table 
shows the price development in wheat prices to the producer (Table 15). 
Table 15. Import and producer prices of grains in Vest Germany, 1951-1954. 
(Index data 1950: 100) 
Meat and other grains 1951 i 1952 1953 1954 
Import price 
Producer price 
124 
122 
129 
162 
107 
159 
95 
157 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1955, pp. 47,3 and 444. 
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Table 16. Producer prices in wheat, Germany 1934 -54. 
Year 
Marks /100 kilogram 
1934-48iteichsmark 
1949.54:Dental:ft Mark U.S. dollars /metric ton 
1934 20.3 81 
1936 20.6 83 
1936 20.6 83 
1937 20.6 83 
1938 20.6 83 
1939 20.5 82 
1940 20.5 82 
1941-47 
1948 26.0 78 
1949* 26.0 67 
1950 33.0 70 
1951 44.2 105 
1952 42.0 100 
1953 41.8 100 
1954 40.7 97 
*Currency reform. 
Source: FAO-Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, Vol. LX, Part 1, 
p. 243. 
It is clearly visible that such increases in producer receipts for 
grain, recorded in the above table (Table 16), must lead to a strong emphasis 
on grain production at German far-ils. This level of producer prices made the 
grain production most profitable in comparison to the expense for labor and 
investment. The producer prices were computed only to the needs of the 
domestic price level without consideration of the world market prices. 
It can be seen that the decrea'ang import price level had no influence 
on the relative axed producer prices. The described protective trade meas- 
ures bring the wheat imports to tna home price level through the activity of 
the governmental "Import and Storage Agencies." This protection gives the 
producer the security that he can sell his wheat at a known price and that 
51 
each quantity he can supply will find a market. Price reductions are only 
allowed due to quality difference. 
The official post.evar agricultural policy realized early that grain 
production was the basis for most German farm systems and that price fixing 
in food grains would establish the sound background for a balanced agricul 
tural program. Since 1953 a ten-year program is underway to bring about a 
basic change in the present German agricultural structure with the final 
goal* the establishment of a modern and efficient German agricultural indus 
try, competitive within an integrated turopean market, but free of government 
subsidies. 
It would be important to show briefly the main points of this long range 
program to realize that the first objective of the official agricultural 
policy is the political goal to make the German agriculture a strong factor in 
the national economy. This contrasted the stated objective of the IRA to 
convince importing countries to reject awn wheat planting and to buy their 
requirements in lower-cost areas. 
The achievement of the cited program is estimated to require capital 
investment ranging between 2.543.0 billion dollars a year, representing a 
considerable increase in capital investment.1 The main problem faced by 
this program is extended land consolidation associated with a reform of the 
land tenure system, especially in Southern Germany. 
The solution of this task shall lead to as increasing average farm size 
to get more efficient farm units. Today in this region over 50 percent of 
1Agriculture Abroad, Department of Agriculture, Ottawa, Canada. 
Volume 9, No. 3, January, 1954. 
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all farms are between 12.5 and 50 acres, composed of more than 21 individual 
land parcels not connected to one another. When the huge job of consolida- 
tion is finished* roughly 12.5 million acres will be increased to sufficient 
farm sizes. This allows economical farm methods with labor-saving mechanized 
equipment useful only at larger farm units. While the number of tractors in 
Germany was 270,000 units in 1953, it is estimated that the German agriculture 
can absorb 200,000-300,000 more tractors arising from the demand out of the 
present program. Besides the unfavorable farm structure, the agricultural 
policy tries to put pressure to lower the present high cost of mechanization. 
This includes reduction of iron, steel and gas prices, simplifications of 
types, introduction of cooperative use of machines, etc. 
It is expected that the capital requirements for this plan will come 
from various sources. At least one-third of the total amount should be 
financed by farmers themselves out of their current income. The farmers 
should be able to do that, because the fixed grain and other producer prices 
make their income very stable and secure. Another source of financing would 
be direct assistance from the Federal and Provincial administrations out of 
tax money. This provides credit at reduced rates of interest for invest- 
ment* cheaper buying of commercial fertilizer, etc. Besides that, subsidies 
for drainage, irrigation and other water regulations are paid. Increasing 
production is also the goal of some other measures introduced by the German 
government which bring aid to agricultural education and research. Agricul- 
tural schools were rebuilt and newly established; the extension service was 
enabled to start again after the war with modern means and a sound financial 
basis; money was spent for the combating of plant and livestock diseases, 
the development of new varieties in seeds, the research in modern marketing 
methods, standardizing and quality improvement. 
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flecause the grain production is an indivisible part of most German 
farm systems, all the described efforts to increase rationalization and ef- 
ficiency of the whole agriculturo will undoubtedly strengthen grain produc- 
tion, acreage and yields including wheat, the most profitable ;rain product, 
as the figures in the production tables indicated. 
Despite the high degree of protection, the German farmers have become 
increasingly discontented during the past three years about the disparity 
between farm and industrial prices and income, the consequence of the sur- 
prising quick recovery and development of the German industry. Since 1951 
there arose differences between prices received and paid by farmers recorded 
in the following figures (Table 17). 
Table 17. Index numbers of prices received and paid by West German farmers, 
1951-1955. 
(1938/39w100) Received Paid 
1951 201 205 
1952 191 211 
1953 196 208 
1954 202 211 
1955 206 215 
Source: FAO-Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, Vol. IX, Part 1, 
p. 291. 
Under the pressure of public opinion and the activity of two principal 
agrioultural organizations, the German parliament adopted in 1955, in addition 
to the discussed 10-year plan, a law which requires the government to present 
a report on the agricultural situntion and progress to the parliament each 
year. At the same time this "Green Report" shall indicate the measures which 
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the government provides to bring the income of agriculture 'nd the other 
parts of the national economy to a p ~ity level. 
This action of parlianent shows a furthe: step to ignore the suP,A.y 
situation of agricultural products, especially in wheats at the world market 
and to stabilize domestic production. The reasons are obviously political 
ones. The adopted policy is the expression of the fear of shortages in wars, 
during crises like Korea and Suez, the dependency on other countries and 
their will or ability to deliver. On the other side, the public, opinion and 
their representation in parties and parliament want to support an agriculture, 
grown important through centuries of history, giving jobs and hon ©s to more 
than 10 million people. One lesson history gave to the country was that one 
cannot call on agriculture in emergency times to do its best and spend all 
resources on men, crops, and livestock for the nation--and let the things 
go on alone in times rhen there is no use for domestical agricultural produc- 
tion. The hope of self-adjustment is at no place more dangerous and unknown 
in its consequences than in the field of agriculture. This seems true in 
view of the whole economy, and political explosions following bad economic 
decisions. But the special case of agriculture and its strong connection 
with soil, climate and production factors which it cannot influence needs 
special consideration. 
International Relationship 
There is a need to add something to the discussion of foreign trade 
already explained under the headline 'Wheat Trade. The number of countries 
trading with Germany has reached the pre.owar level. The first place is taken 
by Western countries while the Eastern trade is reduced, compared with pre-ewur 
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times. In all the years since Germany became an importer most of the grain 
supply came from Eastern Europe. The changing political situation forced 
the Western countries to a narrow cooperation. In 1950 Germany took part 
in the European Payment Union (B.P.U.). This was the beginning of an eco- 
nomic policy in favor of an early liberalization. In the year 1952, the 
Federal Republic began to become a creditor in the B.P.U. and has never ]eft 
this position since that time. In consequence, today about 90 percent of the 
imports aro free from quantitative limitation. But this does not include 
governmental trade, which means products under marketing laws. Wheat fits 
in this case and is another example that the government did not risk to 
bring the domestic agricultural production under competition despite the 
high creditor position against countries supplying wheat and other agricula. 
tural products. 
Another aspect is the lack of dollars resulting in bilateral agreements. 
While the export of agricultural products is without significance in Germany, 
industry produced the bulk of goods traded with foreign countries For the 
export of these manufactures, the country has to participate in agreements 
to import in exchange agricultural products. On page 41 the countries are 
listed to which Germany is obliged to take wheat before it can buy the rest 
at the open world market. This strong dependency leads to an emphasis on 
home wheat production because of the always changing and uncertain number and 
quantities of such bilateral agreements whioh are determined by the wishes of 
domestic industry and the demands of the foreign countries. 
Germany is a member of the "General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade" 
(G.A.T.T*) and signed the obligation to reduce trade barriers and to avoid 
all discrimination in international trade with the goal to rebuild a 
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multilateral trade system all over the world. Tariffs should be again the 
regulator in foreign trade only. But these accepted goals cannot fit to 
government trade as long as basic foodstuffs are under legal limitation. 
This picture shows the will of the German government to provide a liberal 
trade policy on the side of industry, but to give agriculture the most pos- 
sible protection, considering that food production is a national duty. 
FUTURE DEVELOPICNT 
Reunited Germany? 
For the future wheat situation in Europe it will be an important ques- 
tion; what can Germany produce and consume after a possible reunification? 
This means that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic (commonly called West and East Germany) would be one economic unit 
again. But it excludes for the present the territory east of the Oder-Weisse 
Rivers, today under Polish and Russian control. 
The wheat acreage in 1935-38, West and East Germany together, was 
1,747,000 ha. The wheat acreage for the same territory in 1953 is decreased 
to 1,575,000 ha., mainly due to other use in East Germany. The failing 
172,000 ha. are planted today with sugar beets, potatoes and other intensive 
crops, which will be rejected in the ease of reunification because the pro- 
duction in Nast Germany is high enough to provide the East with these prod.. 
nets. It can be assumed, therefore, that the ore-war wheat acreage 7111 soon 
be reached again with the amount of roughly 1,750,000 ha. The production in 
both parts of Germany in 1953 showed the following figures (in metric tons): 
Wheat production: West Germany 
1;..;ast Germany 
Total 
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3,179,500 t 
1,887,600 t 
5,067,100 t 
The consumption in West Germany in. 1954 was composed of production and 
imports minus exports: 
'heat production: Uest Germany 3,358,524 t 
Wheat imports: 2,803,000 t 
Meat exports: 
Total 6,251,524 t 
791 t 
Aheat consumption 6,250,733 t 
This was the consumption for 50 million people, the population of West 
Germany in 1954. If one assumes the same consumption level for a reunited 
Germany one would need for the population of 17 million people at the terriu. 
tory of E ast Germany the amount of 2,121,805 tons of rheat, Subtracting the 
home production of 'East Germany from this figure, one will know the import 
need for the 17 million East Germans: 
East Germany's assumed consumption 2,121,805 t 
East Germany's home production (1953) - 1,887,600 t 
East Germany's import requirement 234,205 t 
If the actual imports of West Germany are added to the import require- 
ment of East Germany at the West German consumption level, one would find 
the total import needs for a united Germany. 
;',heat imports West Germany (1954) 2,893,000 t 
Wheat imports East Germany (assumed) 234,205 t 
Wheat imnorts United Germany (estimated) 3,127,205 t 
58 
The production is figured from the actual planted wheat acreage and 
average yields in both ,arts of Germany in 1954. Should the prewar acreage 
of wheat be reached again (compare p. 56), the production of wheat in a 
united Germany will increase considerably if the acreage is computed with the 
higher post-war yields of 45 bushels per acre. (The average pre-war yield 
per acre was in 1935-39, 3 bushels). It appears that the wheat requirement 
for a United Germany with a population of roughly 70 million people, at the 
assumed consumption level of 'Nest Germany today, will be the amount of nearly 
3,000,000 tons--less than the imports of West Germany alone in 1054. 
East-West Trade 
A well-known statement says that American markets in Germany and else- 
where depend on Germany's and other countries' markets in the United States. 
There is no doubt that Germany would like to buy American quality products 
to a larger extent if the Germans would have the possibility to earn more 
dollars at the United States domestical market. But the trade balance is 
unfavorable and it 8931118 that there will be no considerable change in the 
near future. 
This problem makes the East trade very attractive to secure Germany 
markets for its manufactured products, which must be traded against raw 
material and agricultural goods, the main export articles of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. The development in recent years is obvious. The active 
export policy of the East-bloc countries and their import needs met the in- 
terests of the Western countries to expand their export markets and to find 
resources for their primary goods requirements. The increasing 
trade figures and the approaching settlement of a trade agreement between 
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Germany and Soviet Russia show the significance of the East-West trade re- 
lations in the future. 
Concerning wheat, imports from East Europe to Germany in 1954 reached 
only the amount of roughly one-fourth of the imports from the United States 
but indicate that the stagnation between East and rest was broken. It is not 
clear, if and in what time the Eastern European countries can reach their 
traditional grain supply position again, which they kept before the war, 
because of growing population, industrialization, and increasing demand at 
home. In addition, unfavorable weather conditions, governmental interfer- 
ence, mismanagement in production and distribution, collectivization, etc., 
have been some reasons that the wheat output did not lead always to surplus 
in these countries. But there is no doubt that the tendency to overproduc- 
tion in wheat is upward. At the same time these countries are under compul- 
sory need to import industrial goods, e.a., from Germany for the further 
development of their economies. In May, 1956, six Soviet Bloc countries 
already had bilateral trade agreements in effect rith Germany including four 
countries with wheat delivery contracts. In actual practice, the exchanges 
did not always reach the agreed level. They have often been much lower be- 
cause of the inability of the Eastern countries to deliver. Howvers this 
should not lead to an underestimation. These countries could soon, after e 
period of stabilization or favorable weather conditions, supply West Europe 
again with wheat. This supply mill be probably cheaper than the overseas 
exporters can provide and connected with attractive exchange programs. 
But more attention has to be given to the wheat policy in Russia itself, 
long years one of the world's important exporters in small grains. This 
country appears again as competitor at the world market in wheat. Germany, 
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always the principal market for Russian grain, has immense interest to ob- 
serve this development very carefully. 
In 1954, a new agricultural program was put into action which called 
originally for no less than 32 million new sores in grain, an increase of 
12 peroent in two years. This extension was planned at virgin soils; cen- 
tered in the Urals, Siberia, and Iazakhstan. The regions are located in 
the southeastern states of the U.S.S.R. Most of the new land is to be plowed 
as summer fallow for seeding of wheat in the spring. The program exceeded 
the original plan in the first year and reached in August, 1954, 37 million 
acres. The goal for 1966 was doubled to about 70 million acres, more than 
one -fourth of the total Russian grain area in 1963. The total wheat area 
in the U.S.A., in comparison, was, at its highest point in 1949, 76 million 
acres and deoreased in 1956 to 60 million acres. 
The latest information reported for 1956 a record harvest in these 
areas; "despite the fact that the crop outturn was considerably reduced by 
heavy harvest and post-harvest losses due to bad weather, shortage of drying, 
transportation and storage facilities, and the usual miamanagement. sl 
This immense expansion of the Russian wheat production led to large 
grain supplies in government hands, which now will seek export markets. In 
addition to shipments to East Bloc countries to fill their deficit, e.g., 
in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, grain exports will press to non. 
Communist countries. This means that Germany and other West European net 
importers will have the choice in the future, political calm situation as. 
eumeds to select between Russian or overseas wheat resources. It is obvious 
1The World Agricultural Situation 1957 - USDA -FAS. Washington 25, D.C., 
p. 37. 
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that the country would have the advantage mhioh can supply the largest ex10 
change program to make buying for an import country possible and attraotive 
as an export market for its own industrial goods. 
SUMMARY 
Most of the world's present wheat difficulties are based an the tre- 
mendous surplus stocks piled up around the world, but especially in North 
America. Growing conditions in several recent years were extraordinarily 
favorable. National wheat price programs, politically motivated, have kept 
wheat prices to producers at rigid, artificially high levels that have en+ 
couraged wheat production. In importing countries such political pricing 
has been associated with tight import controls and with consumer prices tied 
to national economic goals rather than to the level of wheat import prices. 
In many exporting countries, too, domestic Wheat prices have been kept above 
"world" levels through governmental intervention; and wheat exports from 
these countries have bean made possible only be governmental subsidies, 
barter agreements, etc. 1 
After the Second World War, the recovery of the West European agricul+ 
ture developed in a sharp increase in production above the pre.dwar level. 
Difficulties to keep balance of payments with the dollar bloc, which coun- 
tries dominate today the world wheat market in contrast to pre-war conditions, 
required from most importing nations a change in their wheat policy. Inten- 
sive use of their domestic agricultural resouroec became the accepted goal. 
Better technology of production, great investments in mechanical equipment, 
1Helen C. Farnsworth, op. cit., p. 247. 
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fertilizers, and seeds increased grain production; supported by high yields 
from potatoes, beets, feed crops and pastures, this led to a high degree of 
self-sufficiency. 
Eastern Europe including Liussia, the traditional supplier of Western 
Europe in wheat, makes all possible attempts to reach this Position again. 
Despite the less encouraging picture of agricultural production in those 
countries since the war, future wheat considerations have to count for their 
slow comeback in the next years. These nations are in serious need for 
industrial goods to raise the standard of living of their unsatisfied people, 
which they try to get in exchange for agricultural products. There is no 
doubt that tremendous production reserves in these countries wait for their 
economic development, depending to a large extent on future political de- 
cisions. 
The increasing recovery of Europe's agriculture and the scarcity of 
dollars in international trade will limit the G.S. -wheat market abroad more 
and more after all generous help programs will expire. Only a substantial 
increase in the bargaining power of the Asiatic and African people can change 
this outlook. In the meantime production restrictions like the soil bank 
program in the U.S.A. are unavoidable. An automatic adjustment of the supply 
to the changed demand situation is hindered by the price support programs of 
the United States which determine at the same time the level of the world 
market price. But high prices in the U.S.A. support in reverse a high produc- 
tion of wheat in importing countries and also in other exporting countries. 
The International Wheat Agreement is an attempt to counterbalance the 
diverse interests of importing and exporting nations. First attempts to 
stabilize the world wheat market through an international agreement were made 
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during the crisis years 1930-33. After 21 international conferences which 
discussed the problem an pa was signed by 22 import and export countries 
in August 1933. But following drought years in North America and rising 
political uncertainty led to a failure. 
After the Second World War, new negotiations arose to solve the old 
problem. In 1949, five exporters and 37 importers signed the first post - 
war TFA to assure importing countries a certain supply and exporting coon- 
tries a known market to just and stable prices. Half of the world wheat 
trade mus included in a system of quotas, assigned to every country, under 
maximum and minimum price arrangements. 
The IWA was renewed for the third term in 1956 amid a decreasing amount 
of interest among wheat trade nations. The agreed quantity is only one» 
fourth of the total world trade and some important wheat producing and con- 
suming nations did not participate. The main criticism of the IWA arose 
through the fact that the Agreement obviously shows more usefulness to ex- 
porters than to importers, It requires public and governmental intervention 
and limits technological progress by keeping comnetition away. The conse- 
quence is higher living cost in importing countries. The rat,. did not succeed 
to decrease the importance of national wheat programs. Fixing of prices for 
some years ahead without any consideration of crop conditions and possible 
over or under supply is dangerous and does not reflect the real market oondi 
tions. The IWA has not been tried so far in years of insufficient supplies; 
therefore, it should be supplemented by a storage agreement in preparation for 
such years. 
The example of one European import country, Germany, the third largest 
importer in world wheat trade, shows the problem for a country on the receiving 
side. Its agriculture is well developed and has reached a high level of 
intensity. Imports provide one-third of the food supply. Large industrial 
exports pay for the imported food stuffs. Through the fact that production 
costs for gain in Germany are higher than in overseas exporting countries, 
the German government had to choose between a liberal or protective agri- 
cultural policy. Since the end of the nineteenth century all systems which 
were practiced favored protectionism. This means sacrificing lower living 
cost for the industrial and urban population for the survival and support 
of a flourishing agriculture. Such decision was largely based on political 
necessities and cannot be explained by economic reasoning. A well function- 
ing system of market interventions and support programs provided the means 
for this protective policy. 
To find the conclusion to some problems of today's world wheat market 
the question remains to be answered: Did the INVA, the first great attempt 
to stabilize wheat production and distribution on a world wide scale, ful- 
fill the hopes of its founders? Obviously not! Declining interest and 
smaller quotas show the fact that most importing countries could not be 
convinced by the TM to reject costly domestic wheat growing and buy their 
wheat requirements under certain price and quantity arrangements in lover 
production cost areas. Because political and economic security, the corner- 
stones for the smooth functioning of a free world's trade, cannot be assured 
by such an Agreement, it nust necessarily fail when a vital important com- 
modity is involved. The solution to the wheat problem alone seems to be 
impossible as long as we do not find answers to the problems of other com- 
modities also and to the political and economic security of the world as a 
whole. 
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The objectives of the IWA are stated as helping producers and consumers 
to overcome the hardships caused by burdensome surpluses and to provide and 
to assure supplies of wheat at equitable and stable prices. 
To approach such far-reaching goals in a world of economic and political 
uncertainty the governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United 
States, as major exporters and some 40 import countries agreed to try to 
solve their wheat problems through international negotiations. 
The time after the second World War seemed to be prepared for a world- 
wide wheat agreement because such an agreement can work only under the as- 
sumption that governments have direct influence on the wheat production 
planning in their particular countries. National wheat programs introduced 
during the depression times and the war emergency had changed the former 
competitive free wheat market to a, in many instances, regulated, artificial 
supoorted wheat economy. 
The first post World War II International Wheat Agreement became effec- 
tive August 1, 1949. It guaranteed the trade of specific import and export 
quotas assigned to individual countries within a range of maximum and minimum 
prices. The yearly total of 456 million bushels of wheat under the first IWA 
was approximately one-half of the total 1949 world wheat trade. An exporting 
country could be relieved of its obligations by reason of short crops and an 
import country could be relieved by reason of the necessity to safeguard its 
balance of payments or its national security. 
The IWA was renewed in 1953 and 1956. There have been no important 
changes of the basic principles since the first agreement, but the number of 
participating nations and the quantities traded varied considerably during 
the course of the following years. On the export side, Argentina and Sweden 
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were added to the main export countries. On the import side, the United 
Kingdom did not renew membership in the second and third agreement. This 
country, the world's largest importer, was convinced that in the face of 
growing surpluses a solution to the world wheat problem is possible only 
through the free action of supply and demand in an unregulated and open mar- 
ket system. Some other countries followed England's example. 
Today, the volume of transactions under the IWA is far from reaching the 
total world trade quantity in wheat and does usually not fulfill the agreed 
quotas. In 1955-56, the IWA sales covered only one-fourth of the world wheat 
trade. 
What are the reasons for these obviously unsuccessful terms of the IWA? 
Why did this contract not give as a world-wide agreement the security for 
which many countries were looking in order to guarantee their wheat require- 
ments? 
The example of the Federal Republic of Germany, the second largest 
European importer, serves the purpose of explaining some important causes of 
the failure of the IWA and indicates the complexity of the problems which are 
involved. 
West Germany has an area of 94,700 square miles, about the size of 
Oregon. It consists of arable land, 35 percent; permanent meadows and pas- 
tures, 23 percent; forests, 28 percent; non-agricultural, 14 percent. Two- 
thirds of the food requirements for a population of 52 million are produced 
by an intensive agriculture on the above area. Imports are necessary to 
provide the rest of the food demanded for which manufactured goods produced 
by highly developed industries are traded. 
The production of wheat is usually more expensive in Europe than in 
overseas export countries. Virgin soils, larger farm units, and the efficient 
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use of man power through modern mechanical equipment give the export countries 
a clear advantage in grain production. But Germamy, as an example for many 
other import countries, grows its own wheat and protects its agriculture from 
the cheaper competitors to a large extent. 
What motives are behind such protective agricultural policy? From the 
biological point of view grain is the basic crop of nearly all German farming 
systems and a substantial part for most crop rotations. Its seeding in se- 
quence with other crops is essential to prevent diseases and unhealthy soil 
conditions. The straw serves as an important source for manure production 
upon which the fertility of long used European soils is largely dependent. 
Considerations of labor management also favor grain because of possibilities 
of effective use of machinery and the excellent distribution of labor demand 
throughout the year in connection with other crops. 
But the major reasons are politically determined. All German govern- 
ments have favored a positive agricultural policy since the end of the nine- 
teenth century. To protect against foreign competition and to keep a flour- 
ishing agriculture as a basis of national life and security different systems 
of helping measures were introduced. The development started with simple 
tariffs (1880.4929) and advanced aver supplementary methods toward making the 
tariffs more effective (1929-1934), to complete market and trade controls 
(1934 - World War II - first post-war years). This "economic nationalism" was 
considered as a direct consequence of world -wide agricultural distress, eco- 
nomic depression, and necessary to keep the country self-sufficient in times 
of emergency. 
The governmental support raised the seeded acreage and prices of wheat 
and other agricultural products to artificial levels which did not agree with 
the supply and demand situation at the world market. 
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rae agricultural policy in West Germany after World War II followed the 
same principles upon which pre-war governmental actions ware based. But 
territorial and economic-political conditions had chant:* very much. The 
main agricultural areas in East Germany which had been utilized to feed a 
great part of the nation were lost. The population, increased by more than 
10 million refugees and expelles, is now concentrated in the heavily indus- 
trialized regions of West Germany and depends more than previously on imports 
for food and employment. 
And just because of this fact a question is raised: Why does not Germany 
import cheap wheat from overseas and reject expensive domestic wheat produc- 
tion to give the industrial population the most acceptable food resource for 
which it is looking? But the German economic policy does not follow such 
lines; on the contrary: supporting and helping the rural population to estab- 
lish a modern and efficient German agrioultural industry which is competitive 
within an integrated European market is the supreme goal. A number of pro- 
grams, subsidized by tremendous sums of tax money, tries to achieve this goal 
in different ways. The reasons are obvious; a sound agriculture is considered 
an important political cornerstone in domestic affairs; agricultural produo- 
tion is essential in times of economic and political emergency and therefore 
must also be kept in times when oth.r sources are available. 
The goal of the IVA has not been reached. Declining participant interest 
and smaller quotas point out the fact that many importing countries could not 
be convinced to seek the solution to their wheat problems by a governmental 
agreement. Too many vital relationships in domestic policies and foreign trade 
=mot be included in a single international agreement, unable, by its nature, 
to take care of the multitude of national peculiarities. 
